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EQUAL PROTECTION UNMODIFIED: JUSTICE
JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE CASE FOR
UNMEDIATED CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Andrew M Siegel*
During Justice John Paul Stevens's first full term on the United States
Supreme Court, the Court decided Craig v. Boren, ushering in three-tiered
judicial scrutiny of equal protection claims. 1 Sharp criticism of the Court's
new doctrine was present at its creation 2 and voices of protest have
continued to howl for more than three decades, articulating an increasingly
predictable set of complaints about the rigidity and the arbitrariness of
modem equal protection methodologies.3 For those writing in this vein,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. BA, Yale
University; JD, New York University School of Law; MA in History, Princeton University.
I would like to thank Abner Greene and Eduardo Pefialver for organizing this symposium,
my co-panelists for their stimulating comments, and my colleagues Josie Brown and Tommy
Crocker for helping me work through my argument. I had the privilege to clerk for Justice
Stevens during October Term 2000 and will forever be in his debt for the opportunity to
learn about law and life by his side.
1. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (stating the test for a gender-based equal
protection challenge in language that created a third "intermediate" tier of review).
2. See, e.g., id at 210, 211 n.* (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that he "would not
endorse" the characterization of the opinion as creating a system of three-tiered review and
"would not welcome a further subdividing of equal protection analysis"); id. at 211-12
(Stevens, J., concurring) (critiquing tiered equal protection analysis and developing an
alternative vision grounded in the belief that "[there is only one Equal Protection Clause");
id. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I would think we have had enough difficulty with
the two standards of review which our cases have recognized... so as to counsel weightily
against the insertion of still another 'standard' between those two."). These criticisms build
on and to a large extent mirror the concerns that Justice Thurgood Marshall and outside
commentators had already begun to raise about the Court's increasingly rigid two-tier
approach. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing dissatisfaction with tiered review); Gerald Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1972) (noting a
growing "malaise" on the Court about two-tiered review and encouraging Justices to follow
their instincts and modify their approach). For an informative and detailed examination of
the history of tiered judicial review, see G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny,
57 S.C. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
3. For external criticism, see, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 481 (2004); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming
Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 161, 163-65 (1984); cf Kenneth L.
Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1977) (arguing in the immediate aftermath of Craig that
equal protection doctrine was hopelessly fractured and offering a unitary substantive account
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4
Justice Stevens's concurrence in Craig has become a canonical text,
obvious assertion that "[t]here is only one
particularly his provocatively
5
Equal Protection Clause."
In this Article, I argue that-as flattering as the attention may be-the
central role that Justice Stevens's Craig opinion has come to play in efforts
to reform equal protection doctrine has tended to obscure both the argument
that Justice Stevens was actually making in that opinion and his broader
equal protection methodology. In particular, I argue that most critics of
tiered equal protection scrutiny-including virtually all academic criticsseek to tear down that doctrinal edifice and replace it with a new (and
usually more complicated) doctrinal structure. 6 In my reading of his
opinions, however, Justice Stevens shows little or no interest in building an
alternative doctrinal super-structure on top of the Equal Protection Clause's
text.7 To the contrary, his project is both simpler and bolder: The Court
should apply the Constitution's guarantee of "equal protection of the laws"
of review, multi-factor balancing tests, or
directly without the use of tiers
8
any other mediating doctrine.

of the Equal Protection Clause as a potential vehicle for establishing more cohesive
doctrine). Within the Court, while others have occasionally voiced skepticism, see, e.g.,
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accepting the
utility of mediating doctrine such as tiered review in theory but attacking the system as it has
developed); supra note 2 (citing opinions of several Justices in Craig), the major critics have
been Justice Stevens and the late Justice Marshall. For Marshall's reasoning, see, for
example, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Marshall v. United
States, 414 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-99
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 3, at 481 (using a quotation from Justice Stevens's
Craig opinion as an epigraph); John Marquez Lundin, Making Equal Protection Analysis
Make Sense, 49 Syracuse L. Rev. 1191, 1195 (1999) (using the same quotation prominently
in the introduction).
5. Craig,429 U.S. at 211.
6. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 3 (advocating a complicated three-pronged doctrinal
test); Lundin, supra note 4 (advocating a new overarching test synthesized from both current
and pre-tiers case law); Shaman, supra note 3 (advocating a balancing test).
7. See infra Part II.
8. Much of the existing scholarly literature assumes that Justice Stevens advocates the
adoption of a formal "balancing test" or "sliding scale" approach akin to the one proposed by
Justice Marshall. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, "There Is Only One Equal Protection
Clause ": An Appreciation of Justice Stevens 's Equal ProtectionJurisprudence,74 Fordham
L. Rev. 2301 (2006); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as
Judicial Minimalism, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 298, 326 (1998) (referring to "an explicit
sliding scale, A la Justices Marshall and Stevens"); cf Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court,
1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 77-78 (1996)
(describing the Court's then-recent cases as reflecting "a modest convergence away from
tiers and toward general balancing of relevant interests" and describing that trend as
"reminiscent of... Justice Stevens's reminder that there is 'only one Equal Protection
Clause'). While James Fleming nicely illustrates that there are important points of contact
between the approaches of Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall, see Fleming, supra,at 2311,
this Article argues that the two approaches diverge substantially both in theory and in
practice. For two analyses of Justice Stevens's equal protection jurisprudence that, while
they assume he is interested in building a formal and consistent doctrinal super-structure
over the Constitution's normative core, treat his proposal as fundamentally distinct from
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If I am right that Justice Stevens's underlying approach 9 to equal
protection cases, properly understood, eschews the use of mediating
doctrine, then the Justice has aligned himself against the great majority of
constitutional scholars and theorists who, regardless of ideology, tend to
assume that the unmediated application of constitutional provisions is either
misguided or impossible or both. Writing in this area, for example, Calvin
Massey has suggested that only the use of mediating doctrine prevents
constitutional litigation from deteriorating into "naked judicial value
selection"' 10 while Cass Sunstein has rejected free-form review of equal
protection claims on rule-of-law grounds, arguing that "[t]he Chancellor's
foot is not a promising basis for antidiscrimination law."'l Writing more
generally about constitutional doctrine, Richard Fallon has suggested that
mediating doctrine is an essential aspect of any coherent effort to
"implement" the Constitution, 12 while Mitchell Berman has recently
insisted that it is logically impossible to apply constitutional provisions to
concrete cases without multiple layers of mediating rules.13
Justice Marshall's, see Goldberg, supra note 3; Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection
Jurisprudence, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1146 (1987).
9. 1 refer to Justice Stevens's "underlying approach" to equal protection cases to
emphasize the fact that there are scattered instances in his jurisprudence where Justice
Stevens offers the seeds of alternative equal protection methodologies that might arguably
grow into new mediating doctrine. See, e.g., City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 452-54 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that he always asks
himself whether he could find a "rational basis" for the distinction at issue, explaining his
understanding of what it means for a law to be "rational"--an understanding that is
substantially more biting than the Court's normal use of such words-and then suggesting a
series of questions that allegedly get to the heart of the constitutional question); Michael M.
v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 497 & n.4, 498 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that tiers are better understood as differing burdens of proof and
advocating a rule whereby statutes that differentiate on the basis of gender are grouped either
with "presumptively unlawful" racial classifications or with presumptively lawful economic
and social classifications depending on whether the distinction is related to "natural
differences between the sexes"). While I read these bits of writing as representing little more
than a semi-reflexive attempt by the Justice and his clerks to write in the same idiom as their
colleagues and, in any case, find them much the minority in his writings, their existence is a
reminder that my thesis describes the general thrust of Justice Stevens's jurisprudence in the
equal protection area and does not apply with academic precision to all his published
utterances on the subject.
10. Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 945, 993 (2004).
11. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 78. Professor Sunstein's remark is directed at the prospect
of replacing the tiers with an ad hoc balancing approach but would presumably apply with
even greater force to a methodology that abandoned the aid of mediating doctrine altogether.
12. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution (2001) [hereinafter Fallon,
Implementing the Constitution]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 TermForeword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54 (1997).
13. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2004)
[hereinafter Berman, Decision Rules]; see also Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility:
Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1487 (2004); Mitchell
N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 781 (2005). On Professor
Berman's reading, these rules need not be expressed but they are always present. See
Berman, Decision Rules, supra, at 11-12. Professor Berman argues that, as a matter of
course, constitutional interpretation requires judicial development of (1) doctrine that
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This Article seeks to bring Justice Stevens's equal protection writings
into conversation with the prevailing scholarly skepticism about
unmediated constitutional interpretation. In Part I, I review the standard
criticisms of tiered equal protection scrutiny and the alternative approaches
to equal protection methodology suggested by leading scholars. In Part II, I
survey Justice Stevens's equal protection methodology, concluding that his
criticisms of tiered scrutiny track the leading academic critiques, but that
the alternative he suggests diverges from their proposals. In particular, this
part explains-and offers evidence for-my assertion that Justice Stevens's
approach to equal protection law involves the unmediated application of
judicial judgment to the constitutional text rather than the development of
alternative doctrinal tests and structures. Finally, in Part III, I raise a
handful of substantial criticisms that have been levied against unmediated
constitutional methodologies and briefly consider whether those criticisms
are borne out by the substance or the consequences of Justice Stevens's
three-decade long experiment with such a methodology.
While this project was, of course, directly sparked by Justice Stevens's
writings, it was also inspired by the Justice in a much more profound and
personal way. As others have long commented, 14 perhaps the defining
vision of Justice Stevens's jurisprudence, indeed of his entire life project,
has been an unshakable faith in the capacity of men and women of the law
to resolve difficult and contentious issues through the application of reason
tempered by experience and humility. To participate actively but humbly in
a reasoned discussion of whether constitutional theorists have underrated
the capacity of judges to achieve just and appropriate results through the
direct application of judgment to constitutional text is, in the end, the best
tribute I can pay to Justice Stevens.
I. TIERS OF SCRUTINY: STANDARD CRITIQUES AND PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM

Though the modem three-tiered approach to equal protection review has
become more and more embedded into the sinews of the law over the last
quarter century, that doctrinal approach has, for whatever reason, never
develops and explains the text's underlying constitutional meaning and (2) doctrine that
translates that meaning into workable rules for deciding concrete cases. As I read Justice
Stevens's equal protection decisions, he thoroughly rejects the need for that second set of
doctrine (what Berman calls "constitutional decisional rules") but is more ambivalent about
the need for the first (development of a detailed substantive reading of the Constitution's
meaning that goes well beyond what is required by the text). I discuss this issue in some
detail. See infra note 68; infra Part III.A.3.

14. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in
Rehnquist Justice: Understanding the Court Dynamic 157 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003);
William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions ofJustice

Stevens, 1989 Duke L.J. 1087; cf Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Justices in the majority for premising their ruling on "an unstated
lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges" and lamenting that the
"endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can only lend credence to the
most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land").
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become fully normalized. 15 Unlike other doctrines that, once adopted,
appear inevitable or unremarkable, tiered review has remained a subject of
comment and criticism, visible to the naked eye and easily identifiable as a
judicial invention. While litigators and lower court judges have, for the
most part,16 found it advisable to frame their arguments in terms of the
tiered approach, Supreme Court Justices and academic commentators have
offered a series of provocative criticisms of the tiered approach, often
coupling such criticisms with ambitious proposals for reform. 17 Their
criticisms and their proposals are worth scrutiny, both for their own sake
and because they provide a contrast that is useful in distilling Justice
Stevens's unique contributions to Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.
A. StandardCritiques of Tiered Review
Commentators have largely offered three overlapping (though
occasionally cross cutting) critiques of tiered equal protection scrutiny.
First, they have argued that the tiers are insufficiently helpful in resolving
real world cases or predicting the behavior of courts. In particular, they
argue that in any close case standard tiered review is non-determinative.
For some commentators, the problem here is one of classification. 18 They
argue that there is simply nothing in the modem doctrine that tells us
conclusively in which box to place statutory schemes that impose burdens
on gays and lesbians, or the mentally ill, or racial majorities. Since the
choice of tier is so crucial to the outcome of the case, seat-of-the-pants
determinations as to the proper classification of a given legislative scheme
are often the deciding factor in resolving cases and those aredefinitionally--difficult to predict.
For others, the problem is not so much the arbitrariness of the
19
classification system as the slipperiness of the analysis of means and ends.

15. The doctrinal blueprint for the prevailing three-tiered approach to equal protection
jurisprudence is so familiar as to barely need repeating. In its starkest form, the doctrine
states that most legislative classifications will receive only "rational basis review" and will
be upheld if the courts discern that the classification is "rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest," that classifications that involve a "suspect class" or burden a
"fundamental right" will be subject to "strict scrutiny" and will be upheld only if they are
"necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest," and that classifications burdening a
few "semi-suspect classes" will be subject to "intermediate scrutiny" and will be upheld only
if they are "substantially related to an important governmental interest." For a full, recent
treatment of the doctrine, see Goldberg, supra note 3.
16. For a rare and interesting example of a lower court judge critiquing tiers of scrutiny
and explicitly resolving a case by using a different methodology, see Montgomery v. Carr,
101 F.3d 1117 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J.).
17. See, e.g., cases and articles cited supra notes 2-3.
18. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal ProtectionIncorporation,88 Va. L. Rev. 951, 954,

961-68 (2002) (arguing that "existing accounts of equal protection leave the decision
whether to treat a classification as suspect-and most other decisions as well-to almost
completely unguided normative judgment").
19. See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, Rationality-andthe IrrationalUnderinclusiveness
of the Civil Rights Laws, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 12 (1988) ("[O]nce the 'level of
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According to this version of the critique, the code words modem tiered
doctrine has developed do a perfectly adequate job of sorting out the easy
cases but simply restate the question in hard cases-for example, asking
whether educational diversity is "compelling" 20 or whether structuring state
law to make it more difficult for gays and lesbians to pass civil rights
statutes is "rational."' 2 1 In particular, this critique has sharp words for
"intermediate scrutiny," 22 arguing that by creating a third category of
review with amorphous standards and assigning to that category the very
characteristics that are sometimes but not always relevant to governmental
decision making, the doctrine gives absolutely no guidance in resolving
disputes about, say, policies limiting the inheritance rights of children bom
outside of a marital relationship 23 or laws treating women and men
24
differently for the purpose of establishing parentage.
A second, somewhat cross cutting, critique of tiered scrutiny argues that
such an approach is too rigid.2 5 According to this critique, the tiered
approach is too blunt-asking big picture questions about the nature of the
classification drawn and then shoehoming wildly dissimilar statutory
enactments into a superficial conformity without any mechanism for taking
into account their dissimilarities. Critics arguing this point insist that
whatever one believes about the ultimate constitutionality of, say,
affirmative action, any methodology that pretends there are no
constitutionally relevant differences between a governmental policy that
seeks to perpetuate racial subordination and one that seeks to ameliorate it
26
is hopelessly mechanistic and sadly out of touch.
Finally, and I would argue most importantly, critics of tiered scrutiny
have argued that the doctrine fails to adequately capture the normative
content of the Equal Protection Clause. 27 In part, this complaint echoes the
analysis' is chosen, the court still must weigh political and moral concerns that the given
case raises to finally determine which party will prevail.").

20. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
21. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

22. For a particularly pointed version of this critique, arguing for the abandonment of
intermediate scrutiny, see George C. Hlavac, Interpretationof the Equal Protection Clause:
A ConstitutionalShell Game, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1349, 1375, 1378 (1993); cf Lawrence
G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 Cal. L. Rev.

819, 821 (2002) (arguing that "[taken seriously, intermediate scrutiny treats an evil as
though it were a mere inconvenience").
23. Compare, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978), with Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420

(1998).
25. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 3, at 508-12 (discussing "rigidity" of tiers); Shaman,
supra note 3, at 173-74 (same).

26. See, e.z., Goldberg, supra note 3, at 508-09; Peter J. Rubin, Reconnectinge Doctrine
and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
27. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 3, at 485-86; cf Kermit Roosevelt I11, Constitutional
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1686-92
(2005) (explaining how equal protection doctrine has lost its fit with the substance of the
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above objection, arguing that the tiers artificially constrict the constitutional
analysis, removing from the calculus any number of factors, circumstances,
and consequences that are relevant to a coherent discussion of whether a
state is denying "equal protection of the laws." This argument is often
coupled with the suggestion that current equal protection doctrine is underinclusive, neglecting for whatever reason to target lower profile forms of
discrimination that transgress
the Fourteenth Amendment's commitment to
28
impartial government.
Critics voicing this objection also argue, albeit more obliquely, that the
failure of modem tiered review to reflect the full normative content of the
Equal Protection Clause is, at least in part, a necessary by-product of the
development of a complicated doctrinal structure and would exist regardless
of the content of that structure. 29 By framing and persistently applying
complicated doctrinal tests, courts interpose mediating concepts between
the case at hand and the relevant constitutional provision. Instead of asking
whether a particular legislative scheme denies "equal protection of the
laws" and meditating on that question, courts ask whether legislation aimed
at a particular group should be treated as a "suspect classification" or
whether a specified governmental purpose is "compelling," "important," or
only "legitimate." Even when courts have derived intelligent and accurate
mediating doctrines (indeed, even when they are interpreting provisions
whose direct application is well-nigh impossible30 and have derived optimal
tests), the simple act of asking questions with different linguistic and
Equal Protection Clause, though suggesting that the Court can relatively easily recalibrate
the doctrine to solve this problem).
28. See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 27, at 1688-89 (discussing the example of sexual
orientation discrimination).
29. See, e.g., Shaman, supra note 3, at 174 ("Under the system attention is concentrated
on conceptions about classifications, interests, levels of scrutiny, and the like, to the extent
that the actual merits of a case are neglected, if not lost altogether in the shuffle.").
30. The classic example here is the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. Unless one
adopts an absolutist position A la Justice Hugo Black (and perhaps even then, see, e.g., G.
Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in
Twentieth-Century America, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 299, 351 n.167 (1996) (explaining, in accord
with most scholars, that even so-called "absolutist" judges have never protected all speech
from all infringements but have instead constructed elaborate rules for determining what
counts as "speech" and what counts as an "infringement")), courts implementing that
command need to develop rules for separating out laws that "abridge the freedom of speech"
in a constitutionally relevant way and laws that do not. While working out the normative
content of the provision gets you part of the way there, few if any judges or commentators
believe such an approach sufficient, without the development of some sorting rules and
mediating tests. That having been said, even in this very different context, there are an
increasing number of judges and commentators, Justice Stevens included, who believe that
the Court has focused its attention too much on its elaborate mediating doctrine and lost
sight of the essence of the constitutional command. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 8, at 230203 (noting that Justice Stevens "might just as well have written ... that '[t]here is only one
First Amendment"'); Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that Are Both
Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 Ind. L.J.
801 (2004) (arguing that the development of a tiered methodology in the First Amendment
context has created law that is stilted and unsatisfying and that the Court, led by Justice
Stevens, is gradually abandoning such an approach).
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conceptual reference points than the Constitution's text have a distortive or
transformative effect, building substantive content into the body of
constitutional law.3 1 Moreover, if, as here, the textual provision in question
expresses its underlying normative commitment in a relatively accessible
fashion, then gaps between that commitment and the results prompted by
the mediating doctrine may well become apparent, especially in close or
novel cases. 32
B. Proposalsfor Reform
The commentators who have participated in the collective project of
critiquing modem equal protection doctrine have parted company when it
comes time for a reformist prescription. Some have argued for a reworking
of current doctrine that retains tiered review but purges it of some of its
noticeable flaws. To this end, scholars have, for example, called for the
adoption of more definitive criteria to determine whether classifications
prompt heightened review, 33 for a more literal application of the doctrinal
tests regardless of consequence, 34 and for the affirmative acknowledgment
of a fourth category of review to deal with classifications aimed at
unpopular groups who nevertheless fail to meet the traditional criteria for
35
strict or intermediate scrutiny.
Others, however, have advocated abandoning tiers altogether and
adopting an alternative doctrinal structure. The most common proposal
draws heavily on the jurisprudence of Justice Thurgood Marshall and
advocates an explicit balancing test or sliding scale approach that weighs
the strength of the government's justification for a classification (including
the persuasiveness of the ends and the tightness of the fit) against the
importance of the right impacted and the invidiousness of the
31. For a general (and generally critical) discussion of this phenomena, see Akhil Reed
Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114

Harv. L. Rev. 26 (2000).
32. At least up to this point in the Article I do not mean to suggest that there is anything
particularly problematic about the degree to which doctrine transforms normative
expectations and creates constitutional meaning, nor do I mean to suggest that courts
necessarily should operate with the assumption that the full normative content of the
Constitution is judicially enforceable. Many commentators have argued with considerable
persuasiveness that the development of mediating doctrine is necessary to implement or
operationalize broad constitutional commitments, see, e.g., Fallon, Implementing the
Constitution, supra note 12, and that due regard for the institutional prerogatives of other
branches requires that courts leave certain constitutional principles under-enforced, see, e.g.,
Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plainclothes: A Theory of American Constitutional Practice
(2004). Full consideration of either of these arguments is beyond the scope of this Article,
though I will consider the former position briefly and with at least a dollop of skepticism in
the coming pages,
33. E.g., Dorf, supra note 18.
34. E.g., Massey, supra note 10.
35. Cf Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence's QuintessentialMillian Moment and Its Impact on
the Doctrineof UnconstitutionalConditions, 50 Vill. L. Rev. 117, 137 (2005) (arguing that
the Court should explicitly apply rational basis with bite in situations where prejudice and
hostility "are especially likely to be present").
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classification. 36 Another prominent proposal, forwarded by Professor
Suzanne Goldberg, argues for a new "standard" that consistently vets
governmental legislation on three axes: the plausibility of the available
justifications in light of the specific regulatory context, the likelihood that
those justifications might apply so broadly as to countenance the
development of impermissible class legislation, and the possibility that the7
3
regulation in question was in actuality the product of bias or stereotype.
What these proposals-and others like them 38-have in common is the
assumption that the fall of the tiers will leave a vacuum that must and will
be filled by another (likely more complicated) doctrinal structure.
II. JUSTICE STEVENS AND MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION METHODOLOGY:

A COMMON DIAGNOSIS AND AN UNCONVENTIONAL PRESCRIPTION
As indicated above, the academic critics of modern equal protection
doctrine tend to treat the writings of Justice Stevens (and Justice Marshall)
as prophetic and inspirational. While such attention is flattering and largely
appropriate, it also tends to amalgamate Justice Stevens's thinking into the
ideas of a larger movement, handicapping efforts to unpack and assimilate
the jurisprudential insights at the heart of his many equal protection
writings. This part seeks to overcome those hurdles by consciously asking
whether his criticisms of tiered review and his proposals for reform track
those of academic commentators or, instead, are distinct in important ways.
A. The Ills of Tiered Review: A FamiliarCritique
Justice Stevens has been strikingly forthright in his distaste for tiered
review, routinely noting the basic reasons for his dissatisfaction and
periodically updating his standard arguments with deeper reflections on the

36. E.g., Shaman, supra note 3.
37. Goldberg, supra note 3, at 491-92.
38. See, e.g., Lundin, supra note 4 (offering another overarching test for equal protection
cases). In addition to those who propose to reform equal protection jurisprudence through
the development of new mediating tests, a substantial number of scholars have proposed
reforming the case law by adopting new or different normative understandings of the
Constitution's meaning. For two classics of this sort, see Karst, supra note 3 (arguing that
the Equal Protection Clause promises "equal citizenship" and reasoning through the Court's
cases on that premise); Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 107 (1976) (reading the Equal Protection Clause as grounded in an "anti-subordination"
principle). Some such articles appear to acknowledge the need for new implementing
doctrine for their proposal, some seem comfortable with the old doctrine as long as they are
put in the service of a new normative vision, and others implicitly suggest that their vision
might be implemented without mediating doctrine. Most, however, are simply silent on the
question of how to implement their vision. Since the bulk of these articles do not address the
question of appropriate mediating doctrine or do not question the propriety of the current
doctrine, they are largely outside the scope of this Article. Their existence and importance,
nonetheless, require acknowledgment.
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problems implicit in such an approach. 39 Though the language of these
explanatory opinions is uniquely the Justice's own, their substance is
strikingly familiar, echoing (or perhaps inspiring) 40 the academic concerns
chronicled above.
In his first year and a half on the Court, Justice Stevens articulated his
objections to the burgeoning of category-driven equal protection doctrine
several times, most notably in his Craig v. Boren concurrence. 4 1 That
opinion begins with the Justice's famous assertion that "[t]here is only one
Equal Protection Clause" and his less-quoted but absolutely essential
'42
corollary that the Clause requires the States to "govern impartially.
Rereading that opinion in the context of three decades of further explication
of the Justice's thinking on equal protection questions, what is striking is
the degree to which a short (four-paragraph) writing focused on a single
epigrammatic sentence encapsulates or at least foreshadows each of the
Justice's major concerns with modem tiered review.
As James Fleming also argues in this Symposium, 43 the assertion that
"there is only one Equal Protection Clause" is not a singular criticism of the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence but rather a jumping off point for
several distinct criticisms. First, the opinion most directly argues that the
tiers are not, as a descriptive matter, reflective of the Court's decision
making, but are instead after-the-fact explanations offered for decisions
arrived at through some other process. 44 Second, the opinion expresses
some concern that the tiers, to the extent they shape the Court's reasoning,
are unduly rigid, limiting the Court's ability to "articulate"-and perhaps,
in the long run, to consider 45-a variety of factors that are crucially

39. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985)
(Stevens, J.,concurring); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 352 n.4 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
40. Since the Justice began to voice his criticisms of tiers even before the three-tier
system had taken hold and stated those criticisms to much fanfare in the case setting up
three-tiered review, it is likely that his ideas had some influence on the academic
commentary that developed in the ensuing years.
41. Craig, 429 U.S. at 211; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("My point.., is to suggest that the line between discriminatory
purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical,
as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume."); cf Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
516, 523 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statutory presumption based largely
on legitimacy was unconstitutional after an analysis that begins with "the proposition that all
persons are created equal," and proceeds to assess "the competing interests at stake in [the]
litigation" without employing tiers or presumptions); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 100 (1976) (discussing and focusing the Court's resolution of the case on the general
constitutional command that both "the federal sovereign" and the States "must govern
impartially").
42. Craig, 429 U.S.at 211.
43. See Fleming, supra note 8.
44. Craig,429 U.S. at 212.
45. I say "in the long run" because, at least at this point in his career, Justice Stevens
appears convinced that the Court's actual method for resolving cases is sufficiently flexible
to take into account these factors, whatever its opinions might say. See id. In the three
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important to resolving equal protection cases. 4 6 Finally, and most
importantly, the opinion strongly suggests-though it does not explicitly
argue-that tiered review does not accurately capture the normative content
of the Equal Protection Clause, in particular the Clause's guarantee to all
citizens (not just those in protected4 7classes) that their concerns will be
considered by an impartial sovereign.
In his opinions since Craig, Justice Stevens has remained remarkably
consistent in his criticisms of tiered review and has developed each of the
above-mentioned themes more richly. For example, his belief that the tiers
are an explanatory rather than an analytical device has flowered into a
firmer conviction that tiered review is incapable of policing the line of
constitutionality. 48 To this end, he has characterized modern tiered doctrine
as "wooden," 4 9 "sterile," 50 and "misleading," 51 and has repeatedly looked
52
behind the doctrine to ask what is truly motivating his colleagues.
In a similar fashion, Justice Stevens has grown increasingly frustrated
with the artificial limits that tiered review imposes upon the factors and
circumstances his colleagues are willing to consider in equal protection
cases. Irrespective of the outcome of the cases, 53 he has routinely
expressed hostility at the rigidity of the categories and impatience with the

intervening decades, however, his conviction on this point appears to have wavered. See
infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
46. Craig,429 U.S. at 212-13.
47. Though the notion is not further developed, the idea that the tiers distort the
substantive content of the Equal Protection Clause to the detriment of those victims of
discrimination who do not fall into traditional protected classes is suggested by the famous
first sentences of the opinion. See id.at 211-12 ("There is only one Equal Protection Clause.
It requires every State to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one
standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.").
48. Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("I have never been persuaded that these so-called 'standards'
adequately explain the decisional process.").
49. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 547 (2000) (Stevens, J.,dissenting). Cayetano
deals with claims under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
50. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 351 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
51. Id.at 351-52; see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1010 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The conclusion that race-conscious districting should not always be subject to
strict scrutiny merely recognizes that our equal protection jurisprudence can sometimes
mislead us with its rigid characterization of suspect classes and levels of scrutiny.").
52. E.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 341 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("What is
clear is that it is not the unavailability of judicially manageable standards that drives today's
decision. It is, instead, a failure of judicial will to condemn even the most blatant violations
of a state legislature's fundamental duty to govern impartially.").
53. It is notable that Justice Stevens's frustration at the rigidity of the prevailing doctrine
is sometimes provoked by the decision to strike down a regulatory scheme that he believes to
have been the product of legitimate governmental deliberation (for example, the districting
plans and affirmative action programs at issue in cases like Bush v. Vera and Adarand
ConstructorsInc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)) and at other times provoked by the decision
to uphold a classification that he believes is only explicable by legislative bias (for example,
the property tax preferences at issue in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992), or the Hyde
Amendments' abortion funding prohibitions, at issue in Harris).
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hollowness of the analysis they provoke.5 4 These concerns are most
obvious in his complicated writings on affirmative action and raceconscious redistricting, 55 but are notably present in a substantial 58
number of
gender discrimination, 56 alienage, 57 and general regulatory cases.
Finally, and most pressingly, Justice Stevens has become increasingly
convinced that the doctrine creates a substantive gap between the case law
and the Constitution's normative commitment to equality. Though the
evidence here is largely impressionistic, it seems that in wading through
decades of cases-particularly those in the areas just mentioned-Justice
Stevens has become increasingly troubled that the tiers push the Court
towards results that are simultaneously over-inclusive and under-inclusive.
More specifically, by making the characteristic the legislature uses to draw
its line determinative of the standard of review, the Court has created a
hierarchy of entitlement that simultaneously dooms honest legislative
concerns 59
attempts to respond to legitimate gender- and race-correlated
60
and gives a free pass to legislative partiality in other contexts.
These arguments find eloquent expression in Justice Stevens's opinions
and his persistent championing of them has, no doubt, played a role in their
substantial acceptance by academic commentators. While the full Court has
never formally embraced these arguments, their influence can be seen in the
outcome and even the reasoning of numerous cases that ostensibly apply
traditional tiered review, but whose results are best explained by positing
that the Justices have implicitly loosened the rigidity of the tiers or perhaps

54. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 441 (1998) (opinion of Stevens, J.)
(deriding party, amici, and dissenters for arguing that an "eminently reasonable" statute
"justified by important Government policies" is nonetheless unconstitutional because it
imposes "a 'gender-based classification'); Bush, 517 U.S. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The conclusion that race-conscious districting should not always be subject to strict
scrutiny merely recognizes that our equal protection jurisprudence can sometimes mislead us
with its rigid characterization of suspect classes and levels of scrutiny."); Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899, 919 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distancing himself from the majority's
attempt "to apply in a rigid fashion the strict scrutiny analysis developed for cases of a far
different type"); cf Harris, 448 U.S. at 352 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
case demonstrates the degree to which the "method" of tiered review "may simply bypass
the real issue").
55. See, e.g., Shaw, 517 U.S. at 918-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting citations to
cases where he has argued against rigid application of strict scrutiny to situations in which a
racial majority attempts to enable a "minority to participate more effectively in the process
of democratic government").
56. See, e.g., Miller, 523 U.S. 420.
57. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 311-12 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Nordlinger. v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. For a list of some of the cases in which Justice Stevens has expressed this frustration
in the race context, see Shaw, 517 U.S. at 918-19. For an example in the gender context, see
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 401 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. An example of this is the case of partisan reentrenchment. See, e.g., Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); see also City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 451-52 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Cases involving classifications based on
alienage, illegal residency, illegitimacy, gender, age, or-as in this case-mental retardation,
do not fit well into sharply defined classifications.").
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even partially weaned themselves from tiered review altogether. 6 1 On the
flaws and dangers of tiered review, Justice Stevens's seemingly iconoclastic
views are well within the constitutional mainstream.
B. But What Comes Next?: Justice Stevens's Embrace of Unmediated
ConstitutionalInterpretation
While Justice Stevens has written substantially more about his preferred
approach to equal protection cases than about his criticism of the tiers, his
ideas on this question are less familiar and harder to pin down. In part, this
disparity stems from the density and as-applied nature of much of his
writing in this area. To put this point colloquially, the affirmative portions
of his equal protection writings involve a lot more showing than telling.
Beyond that, however, I would-and will-argue that Justice Stevens's
preferred equal protection methodology is, at its root, so different from
what we have come to expect from constitutional interpretation that we
have lost our ability to appreciate its salient features. If I am right, Justice
Stevens's underlying approach to the Equal Protection Clause involves
nothing more and nothing less than the direct and unmediated application of
the Constitution's guarantee of "equal protection of the laws." 62
1. A Few Preliminary Observations on the Nature of Unmediated
Constitutional Interpretation
A few caveats are necessary before I turn to Justice Stevens's writings.
First, in positing a methodology of unmediated constitutional interpretation,
I do not mean to suggest that a judge applying such a method would skip to
his or her conclusion without any analysis. The conventions of judicial
practice require a judge to provide such analysis 63 and nearly all judicial
opinions, including quite obviously those of Justice Stevens, ask
intermediate questions that help propel the jurist towards a final judgment
in any given case. Second, I do not mean to adopt the Panglossian notion
that the concept of "equality" is so fixed so as to allow its content to be
accessed in an objective or universally unobjectionable way.
Our
64
experiences as a nation are strikingly to the contrary.
61. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding a race-conscious law
school admission program while ostensibly applying strict scrutiny); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a state constitutional amendment that made it more difficult
for gays and lesbians to obtain statutory protection for discrimination while ostensibly
applying rational basis review); Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (striking down zoning laws that
disfavor the mentally retarded while ostensibly applying rational basis review).
62. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. Cf Chad M. Oldfather, Defining JudicialInactivism: Models ofAdjudication and the
Duty to Decide, 94 Geo. L.J. 121 (2005) (discussing the scope of the courts' duty to decide
cases and arguing for at least modest requirements of candor, responsiveness, and
elaboration).
64. Societal consensus on the meaning of "equality" is famously elusive. See, e.g., Doff,
supra note 18, at 957 ("At the conceptual level ... equality is either entirely empty or so
hotly contested that it can be invoked with (equal?) aplomb by those on either side of our
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What then would unmediated constitutional interpretation look like? I
will largely explore that question in describing Justice Stevens's
methodology, but a brief preliminary sketch will provide a standard against
which the Justice's writings can be measured.
In rough form, an
unmediated approach to equal protection jurisprudence would begin by
ascertaining in a largely nonlinguistic way a vision of the "equality"
promised by the text. It would then proceed to frame every inquiry into the
constitutionality of governmental action around the question whether that
vision is thwarted by the regulatory scheme in question. In ascertaining the
appropriate answer in any given case, a judge applying such a methodology
might-and probably should-ask a variety of questions about the
challenged statute, its impact on individuals, and the various overlapping
contexts in which it emerged, but such a jurist would not be compelled to
ask any particular set of questions in any given case or to reach a particular
conclusion based on the matrix of answers he or she receives to those
questions. Such a judge would then end the inquiry where it began,
wondering whether in light of all of the information uncovered by these
helpful questions, the scheme in question 65violates the Constitution's
commitment to "equal protection of the laws."
2. Does Justice Stevens Practice Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation?
Justice Stevens never says explicitly that his equal protection
jurisprudence is a form of unmediated constitutional interpretation. In fact,
in a number of opinions he goes to great pains to explain the intermediate
steps that he takes in evaluating equal protection challenges, in one case
even listing a series of "basic questions" "we have to ask" in "every equal
protection case." 66 Nevertheless, if one looks at his equal protection

national questions ....
"); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact,
Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 Fordham L. Rev.
2313 (2006); cf Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982)
(famously arguing that "equality" is such a contested and under-theorized concept that it
lacks any normative utility).
65. While the focus of this Article is limited to Justice Stevens's opinions, it is worth
noting that the Court's opinion in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, a decision which the
Justice joined and over which he undoubtedly rejoiced, reads like an almost comical
amalgam of two distinct methodologies. Large chunks of the opinion persuasively reject
Colorado's Amendment 2 based on its direct conflict with the central norms of the Equal
Protection Clause without resort to tiered analysis. Others portions attempt to translate the
determination into the conclusion that the provision is not "rationally related" to a
"legitimate state interest" with more conviction than finesse. The difference between the
two portions of Romer nicely illustrate the difference between mediated and unmediated
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
66. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 453 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens listed the basic
questions to ask as follows:
In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. What
class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a "tradition of
disfavor" by our laws? What is the public purpose that is being served by the law?
What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate
most divisive
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opinions over thirty years from a broad perspective, there is much evidence
that his underlying approach to such cases is largely unmediated. The
manner in which he structures his opinions and the substance of his writing
both point to that conclusion.
a. Articulating and Forwardinga Normative Vision of the Equal Protection
Clause
As one might expect from a jurist pursuing an unmediated approach,
Justice Stevens puts substantial energy into developing and articulating a
normative vision of the Constitution's meaning. He is not content with a
set of rules for implementing the Constitution but instead wants to
understand at a deeper level what it means to prohibit states from denying
those within their borders "the equal protection of the laws."
His
opinions-particularly his concurrences and dissents 67-tend to blur the
line between constitutional law and constitutional theory, proffering a
vision of the Equal Protection Clause's promise that turns on ideas of
"impartiality" and "rationality" while simultaneously resolving the concrete
68
disputes before him.
treatment? In most cases the answer to these questions will tell us whether the
statute has a "rational basis."
Id.
67. Concurrences and dissents tend to be a better window into a Justice's true thoughts
because they often speak only for the author and, even when carrying the signatures of
others, do not reflect the kinds of compromises and elisions often necessary to gain a
majority.
68. The Justice's reliance on terms such as "impartiality" and "rationality" raises an
immediate objection to my thesis that Justice Stevens practices "unmediated" constitutional
interpretation. After all, those terms are no more mentioned in the Constitution's text than
standards of review. If Justice Stevens relies on these concepts to shape his thinking in any
sort of systematic way, aren't they serving as a form of mediating doctrine? This is a fair
question, albeit one that loses some of its bite on careful inspection. As Mitchell Berman
and Kermit Roosevelt have recently emphasized, judicial discussion of constitutional rules
can largely be divided into two categories: discussion meant to uncover and capture in
words the underlying normative vision of a particular textual provision and discussion meant
to design and explain rules for implementing that constitutional vision. See generally
Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 13; Roosevelt, supra note 27. For Justice Stevens, the
idea of an "impartial sovereign" and the requirement of genuine "rationality" in legislative
action are attempts to explicate the Constitution's meaning rather than doctrinal tools for
pursuing that vision. As such, they serve a fundamentally different role in his analysis than
tiers of review, balancing tests, presumptions, and other similar implementing doctrine
would serve. I think it can plausibly be argued that a jurist who aggressively rejects
"implementing doctrine" is practicing "unmediated" constitutional interpretation even if he
or she spends significant time and energy developing a normative vision of the text's
underlying meaning. That having been said, my argument that Justice Stevens is practicing
"unmediated" constitutional interpretation goes further.
In addition to eschewing
implementing doctrine (or, to use Professor Berman's term, constitutional decisional rules),
Justice Stevens is committed to a substantive understanding of the Equal Protection Clause
that hews fairly closely to the constitutional text. In explaining the overarching purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Stevens does not recount history, cite to philosophers
and theorists, or speculate about the role of the courts in a constitutional democracy. Instead,
he offers his vision in plain and unapologetic language, almost as if he assumes that his
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Rather than scattering his discussion of normative matters throughout his
opinions, Justice Stevens likes to lead with them. His writings (or the
discussion sections thereof) often begin with a strong and clear articulation
of the Equal Protection Clause's central meaning. In one early case, his
69
jumping off point was "the proposition that all persons are created equal."
In a number of other cases, he launched his analysis with the statement that
the Constitution guarantees an impartial sovereign 70 or requires that the
the central
states "govern impartially." 7 1 In still other cases, he framed
73
72
normative principle in terms of rationality or "legitimacy.
These normative statements are not-as they might be in the writing of
other Justices-mere precatory preening. Nor are they hints towards the
standard of review the Justice intends to apply. Instead, they serve a more
substantive and fundamental role in his opinions. In case after case, these
broad normative statements announce a polar star, a textually grounded
fixed point which the rest of the opinion will use to navigate the dense (and
perhaps unmappable) landscape of equal protection review. Justice Stevens
might wander off and examine an interesting patch of evidence about the
legislature's motive or the historical treatment of the minority group at
issue, but, when it comes time to evaluate that evidence,74he returns time and
again to the normative principles that front the opinion.
In articulating the particular normative principles that guide his equal
protection analysis, Justice Stevens hews fairly closely to the text.
Sometimes he does so directly, asking, for example, whether a scheme
accords "equal justice under law." 75 More often than not, his fidelity to the
text is more subtle. While the words "impartiality" and "rationality" do not
appear in the Equal Protection Clause, they are strongly suggested by the
full text of the provision. Within the constraints of our language, Justice
Stevens's formulations-in particular his repeated references to
commonsensical reading of the clause ought to be self-evident from the text. As I argue
below, one gets the sense that Justice Stevens views "impartiality" as a fairly literal oneword translation of the text's command. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text
(discussing this issue further).
69. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf U.S.
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (inquiring into

whether an "impartial lawmaker" might accept a proposed justification).
71. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lyng
v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 636 n.2 (1986); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 349, (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); N.Y. City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 100 (1976).
72. E.z., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 213 (1976) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
73. E.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452.

74. For some examples, see cases cited infra notes 103-04.
75. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100 ("The concept of equal justice under law is served by the.
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 516 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("We are committed to the proposition that all
persons are created equal.").
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"impartiality"-are credible one-word encapsulations of the textual promise
that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."'76 Given that the conventions of judging and the
requirement of transparency compel the Justice to articulate in words a
largely nonlinguistic understanding of the equal protection promise, it is
hard to imagine a single-word formulation that would shift our focus less
77
far from the Constitution's text than the ones the Justice has selected.
b. Detailedand Case-Specific Inquiry andApplication
When Justice Stevens turns from articulating the relevant normative
principles to applying them in concrete cases, his principal strategies track
his normative commitments. For example, having stated that the core
concern of the Equal Protection Clause is whether governmental action
accords with what one would expect of an "impartial sovereign," 78 the
Justice more often than not focuses his inquiry directly at the question of
legislative partiality, usually through a comprehensive, lawyerly
examination of the plausibility of the proffered rationales for the statute. 79
While the Justice occasionally slides into the language of presumptions, 80
his normal approach to this inquiry is to assess the evidence of a
justification's plausibility head-on without resort to any such sorting rule.
In a large number of difficult and controversial equal protection cases,
Justice Stevens has rested his vote primarily or exclusively on an
observation that the factual record either belied or supported the proposed
81
neutral justifications for the law.
76. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
77. Certainly, "equality"-a contested term, see supra note 64, that seems to suggest an
end state rather than a process-would serve no better.
78. See supra note 70 (citing cases).
79. The examples are legion. For cases where such an examination leads to the
conclusion that the law in question is not sustained by an impartial reason, see, for example,
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 496-502 (1981) (Stevens, J.,dissenting)
(looking at evidence and arguments proffered by the legislature and the majority, focusing
on whether they are empirically and logically sound, and rejecting them as illogical);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 219-20 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (looking at
evidence for an alleged administrative and fiscal justification and finding that, because the
costs of the challenged classification are so high and the gains so small, no rational
legislature motivated by such concerns would have adopted the statute in question); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 355-57 (1980) (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (finding a proposed neutral
fiscal justification ludicrous because it is much more expensive to pay for childbirth and
medical care for children than for abortions and concluding that the Hyde Amendments did
little more than "require the expenditure of millions and millions of dollars in order to thwart
the exercise of a constitutional right"). For an example of a case where a similar
examination led Justice Stevens to uphold a statute, see N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979).
80. See, e.g., Michael M, 450 U.S. at 497 n.4.
81. In addition to the cases cited supra note 79, see, for example, Pers. Adm'r of Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding that "the answer"
to the constitutional question in a case involving an alleged sub silentio gender classification
"is largely provided by the fact that the number of males disadvantaged by [the statute]
(1,867,000) is sufficiently large-and sufficiently close to the number of disadvantaged

2356

FORDHAMLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

Second, in the cases where Justice Stevens finds it necessary to move
beyond the text of the statute and its fit with the proffered justification in
order to resolve an equal protection challenge, he has been quite eclectic in
the types of evidence he is willing to consider and quite case-specific in
determining how much weight to give to each type. 82 No one type of
evidence trumps; no single question directs his analysis. In reaching his
final conclusion as to whether a given regulatory scheme is the action of an
impartial sovereign, Justice Stevens has shown interest in the specific
drafting history of the provisions in question, 83 the broader history of
regulations of this kind,84 the general social history of the groups burdened
by the scheme, 85 and the consequences of the laws. 86 The evidentiary
questions that he asks, the order in which he asks them, and the use he
makes of the answers is different in literally every single case.
The Justice's commitment to treating each equal protection case as a
unique pursuit of the Constitution's normative vision also means that he is
less committed to maintaining linguistic consistency from case to case than
would be a justice who is focused on creating and maintaining a system of
mediating doctrine. If, in the specific circumstances of a given case, pursuit
of an answer to the question of whether the legislature acted impartially
requires examination of a subsidiary question about whose import he has
previously expressed skepticism, Justice Stevens will pursue the inquiry, his
previous words notwithstanding. For example, while the Justice has on
several occasions downplayed the importance and even the relevance of
evidence that legislators acted with an "improper motive," 87 in other
females (2,954,000)--to refute the claim that the rule was intended to benefit males as a
class over females as a class"). Cf Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1153-57 (2005)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (voting to strike down a California policy of segregating prisoners
without remanding the case for application of strict scrutiny because the State's failure to
present any empirical evidence to support its claims and logical fallacies implicit in the
State's argument demonstrate that the policy was not the product of careful deliberation by
an impartial sovereign).
82. The evidentiary eclecticism that Justice Stevens embraces in this constitutional
context is directly analogous to the approach he takes in statutory interpretation cases. See,
e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1913 (2006).
83. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that "the record convinces me" that the permit requirement
at issue was not adopted as a rational attempt to deal with the special needs and limits of the
mentally retarded but instead was "required because of the irrational fears of neighboring
property owners").
84. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 308-09 (1978) (Stevens, J, dissenting)
(discussing the history of and reasons for the traditional tendency to exclude noncitizens
from certain forms of public employment).
85. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 532-34 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the history of discrimination against native Hawaiians and of a special ward-like
relationship between them and the United States government).
86. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 496-502 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (comparing the consequences for teen pregnancy rates of gender-specific and
gender-neutral statutory rape laws).
87. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("A law conscripting clerics should not be invalidated because an atheist voted for it.").
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situations, he has not been shy about framing his inquiry around the
question whether the legislature acted out of bias or stereotype and pursuing
all forms of evidence that might serve to unmask legislative bias and
ignorance. 88 Similarly, while Justice Stevens has at times insisted that a
statute may be justified on any neutral ground even if there is no evidence
the legislature considered that rationale, 89 he has at other times taken the
logical implausibility or factual inaccuracy of the legislature's proffered
justifications as grounds for concluding that a law lacked sufficient indicia
of impartiality. 90 To take an even more straightforward example, while the
Justice has stated and relied on the assertion that "[t]he word 'discriminate'
does not appear in the Equal Protection Clause," 9 1 he has also been willing
to employ the term and concept of "discrimination" to help differentiate
between constitutionally permitted and constitutionally proscribed race92
conscious legislation (albeit while putting that term in quotation marks).
93
Perhaps these tensions between cases are reconcilable on their face and
certainly one has no right to expect absolute consistency from case to case
over a thirty-year period. Nonetheless, I suspect that the Justice's
willingness to act in case B in a way that might be inconsistent with a
methodological pronouncement in case A has much to do with his sense that
every equal protection case is different and his concomitant commitment to
resolve each case based on a holistic assessment of whether the government
Justice Stevens offers
has acted as would an impartial sovereign.
generalized pronouncements as to the types of evidence he is likely to
follow and the kinds of questions that are helpful to him in resolving equal
protection cases as part of his obligations as a judge in a system of
common-law constitutionalism. But the rules and framing propositions he
88. See, e.g., Michael M, 450 U.S. at 499-500 (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (concluding that
a gender-specific statutory rape law must have been the product of stereotyping rather than
rational legislative choice); Foley, 435 U.S. at 307, 308-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the actual reasons for laws banning the public employment of aliens were
impermissible patronage concerns); see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 220 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("It is inconceivable that Congress would have
authorized such large expenditures for an administrative purpose without the benefit of any
cost analysis, or indeed, without even discussing the problem. I am therefore convinced that
administrative convenience was not the actual reason for the discrimination.").
89. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
90. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 79. To be clear, it is not that Justice Stevens rejects
proposed justifications because the state did not consider them, but rather that he assumes
fairly quickly that the justifications offered by the state are the only plausible ones and that
refuting them is sufficient to establish a likelihood of bias or stereotyping. One recent case
where this approach is fairly clear is Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 1153 (2005)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), see supra note 81, but this tendency is present to some degree in
many of his equal protection writings.
dissenting).
91. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
92. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1011 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. For example, Fritz offers a credible effort at explaining how Justice Stevens's
methodology rejects the notion that only "actual" governmental motivation counts while
simultaneously screening for claims of bias and stereotype. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 180-82
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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offers are constantly being tested by the unique facts of new cases and need
not-indeed, ought not-be followed if they prove unhelpful or
counterproductive in future cases.
c. Express Advocacy ofEvidentiary Eclecticism and Frustrationwith the
Rigidity of His Colleagues
The flexibility of Justice Stevens's inquiry is not accidental. To the
contrary, Justice Stevens expressly views evidentiary eclecticism and case
specificity as virtues in the equal protection context. While the Justice will
frequently express the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in broad
terms,94 he is famously unsympathetic to attempts to frame the rules for
applying that meaning to cases in a similarly broad fashion. He is skeptical
of the utility of "an attempt to articulate [an equal protection standard] in
all-encompassing terms" 95 and dismissive of decisions that turn on the rote
application of "glittering generalities. '96 For three decades, Justice Stevens
has consistently argued for the proposition that the answer to the toughest
equal protection cases lies not in broad rules but in the details of the
statutory scheme and the accompanying legislative and historical record.
As Justice Stevens has endeavored to demonstrate the virtues of his
approach, he has consistently used the approach of his colleagues as a foil.
While his colleagues have been surprisingly reluctant to engage the
substance of Justice Stevens's equal protection jurisprudence, 97 he has
sharpened the affirmative case for his eclectic and free-form methodology
by demonstrating the drawbacks-and on occasion the absurdities-of the
standard tiered approach. In critiquing the work of the other Justices,
Justice Stevens has shown particular passion and frustration in cases where
he believes his colleagues have simply failed to take into account salient
pockets of evidence because of the ostensible requirements of their
98
doctrinal rules.
While visible elsewhere, this theme is best illustrated by Justice
Stevens's dissents in cases involving race-conscious policies intended to aid
traditionally disadvantaged groups. Though Justice Stevens is by no means
a rubber stamp for affirmative action programs, 99 he has sharply critiqued
the Court for ignoring the historically grounded difference between "a
policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to
eradicate racial subordination," insisting that "[n]o sensible conception of
94. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
95. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
96. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 527 (2000) (Stevens, J.,dissenting).

97. They have also been reluctant to engage the substance of his critiques of tiered
review.
98. Again, the parallels to statutory interpretation cases are striking. See generally
Greene, supra note 82.
99. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
532-34 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the Government's constitutional obligation to 'govern impartially,' would
treat the two the same." 100 Similarly, when dissenting from the series of
cases striking down legislative districts drawn with the "predominant
purpose" of electing racial minorities, he has expressed genuine bafflement
that the majority allows the constitutionality of intentionally drawn
majority-minority districts to turn on little more than a syllogism framed
around the propositions that such districts are in essence racial
classifications and therefore are presumptively unconstitutional. 10 1
Even more than the majority's conclusions in these cases, Justice Stevens
takes issue with a methodology that leaves no room for consideration of the
difference between statutes drawn to keep minorities out of government and
those drawn to include them or even the difference between race-conscious
schemes that specifically harm individuals of other races and those that
classify by race without imposing any concrete harms. 10 2 The point here is
not that these differences are necessarily dispositive-though Justice
Stevens ultimately concludes that they often are-but that they are
differences, salient facts that must be weighed, balanced, and evaluated
before a responsible jurist can make an assessment as to whether legislation
violates equal protection norms.
d. ConclusionsExpressly Grounded in Normative Precepts
Another defining characteristic of Justice Stevens's equal protection
methodology is his tendency, particularly in his separate opinions, to return
to first principles when announcing and providing the ultimate justification
for his conclusion. In the great majority of his equal protection writings, his
concluding paragraph or sentence appeals explicitly to the equal protection
norm, either by referencing the constitutional text directly or, more often,
by discussing whether the regulatory scheme in question reflects impartial,
legitimate, or rational lawmaking. 10 3 In other cases, these norms are more
subtly weaved into the body of the analysis, explaining the questions he
chooses to pose, the kinds of evidence he finds persuasive, and the kinds of
100. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 918-19 (1996) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing similarly and collecting citations to numerous other opinions of his
that also make such arguments).
101. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1003 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 918 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
929 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. On the absence of concrete harms, see, for example, Miller, 515 U.S. at 929-31.
103. For example, he concludes an assessment of the constitutionality of California's
gender-specific statutory rape law by observing, "[a] rule that authorizes punishment of only
one of two equally guilty wrongdoers violates the essence of the constitutional requirement
that the sovereign must govern impartially." Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,
502 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Similarly, when assessing the constitutionality of
legislation that singles out medically indicated abortions from other medical procedures for
the purpose of Medicaid funding, he concludes, "In my judgment, these Amendments
constitute an unjustifiable, and indeed blatant, violation of the sovereign's duty to govern
impartially." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 356-57 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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governmental arguments he declines to credit. 104 In almost every equal
protection case in which he has written, however, Justice Stevens has
always kept the normative content of the Equal Protection Clause close at
hand, declining to take more than one or two steps out into doctrinal parsing
or policy analysis without then returning to his central normative concerns.
Justice Stevens has described the Court's equal protection case law as
reflecting "a continuum of judgmental responses to differing
classifications," rather than "well-defined standards" of review. 10 5 Despite
suggestions to the contrary by some commentators, 10 6 it is not immediately
clear, either from the context of the remark or from his behavior in other
cases, whether Justice Stevens approves of an equal protection
methodology built around the notion of a "continuum" or whether he would
relegate that construct to the scrap heap along with more rigid sorting
devices such as "well-defined" tiers of review. What is abundantly clear,
however, is that Justice Stevens embraces the notion that resolving concrete
equal protection cases requires "judgmental responses to differing
classifications."'107 For Justice Stevens, resolving equal protection cases
requires a clear understanding and articulation of the equal protection ideal,
a roll-up-the-sleeves attitude towards uncovering relevant evidence coupled
with a flexible approach to identifying such evidence, and an eye firmly
fixed on the equal protection norm. At every step along the way, such a
methodology relies on judicial judgment to keep the Constitution on course.
III. ASSESSING JUSTICE STEVENS'S UNMEDIATED EQUAL PROTECTION
JURISPRUDENCE

If I am right that Justice Stevens has waded out into the middle of the
lake with only a firm conviction as to the normative content of the Equal
Protection Clause and his own judgment as a paddle, constitutional theorists
ought to be dying to know whether he has sunk or swum. After all, many
commentators of varying stripes have expressed either strong reservations
about the wisdom of such a methodology, or skepticism about its
plausibility, or both. 10 8 If, largely without notice, Justice Stevens has
actually been applying an unmediated methodology for three decades
without incident, indeed while earning generally positive reviews for the
104. Perhaps no opinion he has written refers to the theme of governmental impartiality
more often than the Justice's recent dissent in the partisan gerrymandering case Vieth v.
Jubelirer,541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting), an opinion that concludes with
the admonition that the majority's refusal to treat such claims as justiciable reflects "a failure
of judicial will to condemn even the most blatant violations of a state legislature's
fundamental duty to govern impartially." Id.at 341; see also id.at 317, 318, 326, 333 &
n.26, 337, 341 (making nine additional references to the requirement that the legislature act
"impartially").
105. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
106. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 8.
107. Cleburne,473 U.S. at 451.
108. For some examples, see supra notes 10-13.

2006]

EQUAL PROTECTION UNMODIFIED

2361

meticulousness and moral perspicacity of his jurisprudence, then perhaps
the academy has overstated the problems with such an approach.
I hesitate to conclude as much in advance of a full examination of the
substance and consequences of the Justice's equal protection project and, of
course, have no room for such a lengthy undertaking in this Article.
However, even a cursory comparison of the Justice's record with the
standard substantive critiques of unmediated constitutional interpretation
demonstrates that the case against such an approach is neither as simple nor
as clear as theorists have posited.
In the remainder of this part, I perform two tasks. First, I take in turn
three of the leading criticisms of unmediated constitutional interpretation
and ask whether they find support in Justice Stevens's record. Finding little
evidence to confirm these criticisms, I then offer a fourth potential objection
to unmediated interpretation-partially borrowed from other commentators
and partially my own-that has a bit more purchase.
A. Three StandardObjections
1. Argument 1: Unmediated Interpretation Is a Threat to the Rule of Law
Some scholars have argued that unmediated constitutional interpretation
is unduly destructive of rule-of-law values, particularly predictability and
consistency. 10 9 According to this argument, mediating doctrine plays a
crucial role in insuring that judicial decisions reflect a relatively consistent,
stable, and coherent set of principles. If governments do not know in
advance what rules the courts are going to apply, they will be unable to
adjust their behavior accordingly. If judges do not apply a coordinated set
of doctrines of sufficient specificity, they will reach contradictory results.
Constitutional law will cease to be a system of rules, with consequences
ranging from a substantial increase in litigation costs to a loss of public
confidence in the wisdom and impartiality of the bench.
Here, assuming that we are grading on a curve, Justice Stevens passes
with flying colors. The results that the Justice has reached have not been
noticeably inconsistent either with the full Court's opinions or with each
other. Particularly in recent years, he has dissented relatively rarely in
equal protection cases,11 0 and when he has, he has been joined more often
than not by several Justices applying more traditional methods."' While,
109. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8.

110. Justice Stevens has been in the majority in the great majority of the contentious
recent equal protection cases, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001), United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

111. Justice Stevens's major area of disagreement with the modem court has been racial
redistricting cases. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. In that area, he has been
joined uniformly by Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. His
few solo dissents in recent years have turned largely on procedural issues. See, e.g., Johnson
v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1153-57 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Cent. State Univ. v.
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over the course of his career, he has been something of an unpredictable
vote in gender and affirmative action cases, 1 12 the full Court has been no
more consistent in its result in those cases and has by most measures been
substantially less consistent in its reasoning. 113 On issues involving the
constitutionality of discrimination on the basis of mental retardation and
sexual orientation, 1 14 Justice Stevens's unflagging commitment to
legislative impartiality has been, if anything, more determinative than other
Justices' reliance on the tiers, making his vote more predictable in such
cases than those of his colleagues."15
2. Argument 2: Unmediated Interpretation Is an Invitation to Judicial
Policy Making
Other scholars have suggested that mediating doctrine is all that stands
between us and "naked judicial value selection." 1 6 They argue that, in the
absence of tiers of review or some other device to constrain judicial
judgment, judges will-either consciously or unconsciously-import their
own subjective notions of justice into constitutional analysis, mistaking
17
heartfelt personal policy preferences for constitutional imperatives."
Mediating doctrine serves to dim the prospects of such blatant judicial
policy making by forcing judges to meditate not on abstract philosophical
questions about constitutional meaning but on more specific and more
manageable intermediate questions. Moreover, as long as the doctrine is
framed in sufficiently broad terms, 1 8 it will work to impose at least a
rudimentary neutrality constraint on jurists, preventing the most blatant
forms of judicial favoritism or partisanship.
Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124, 130 (1999) (Stevens, J.,dissenting); United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 476 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Nordlinger
v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 30 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (solo dissent on the merits).
112. On Justice Stevens's initial skepticism about affirmative action, see, for example,
cases cited supra note 99. For one recent case in which Justice Stevens split with his usual
allies and cast the decisive vote to uphold a gender classification that many commentators
assumed doomed, see Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 53.
113. Justice Stevens was, after all, in the majority in both United States v. Virginia
(arguably ratcheting up the standard of review for gender discrimination claims) and Nguyen
(arguably ratcheting them down).
114. E.g., Romer, 517 U.S. 620; City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985).
115. Cf Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Cases involving
classification based on alienage, illegal residency, illegitimacy, gender, age, or-as in this
case-mental retardation, do not fit well into sharply defined classifications.").
116. The phrase belongs to Professor Massey, see supra note 10, at 993, but the idea is
widely shared.
117. For such scholars, the fact that Justice Stevens has been predictable and consistent
does not answer all objections to his use of unmediated constitutional interpretation. To the
contrary, it underscores a suspicion that the lack of mediating doctrine may have allowed
him to vote his policy preferences in equal protection cases.
118. Doctrine that tells a court to treat cases that draw lines on the basis of race or
political affiliation in a particular way imposes at least a superficial neutrality constraint.
Doctrine that tells a court to treat all cases involving African-Americans or Democrats in a
particular way obviously would not.
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While these arguments are not directly refutable, the experience of the
modem Court suggests that they are, at minimum, overblown. To begin
with, these arguments are premised on the assumption that mediating
doctrine actually imposes a substantial constraint on judicial decision
making. While it was once thought that the tiers of review imposed such a
constraint in the equal protection context, 119 the last quarter century of
cases have cast doubt on that belief, leaving many court watchers convinced
that the crucial decisions in the application of the tiers all ultimately require
a resort to "unguided normative judgment."' 20 More importantly, scholars
such as Ted White and Kermit Roosevelt have demonstrated that mediating
doctrine by its very nature tends to become less useful as a constraint on
judicial decision making as it ages, particularly if the decisions it
12 1
commands no longer reflect society's values and moral commitments.
Moreover, to the extent that some degree of judicial value judgment is
implicit in constitutional litigation, there is something to be said for a
methodology, like that of Justice Stevens, that elucidates a substantive
vision of the Constitution directly and then expressly evaluates the available
evidence in any given equal protection case against standards discerned
directly from that exercise. Certainly, it is easier to understand-and to
critique-a judicial opinion that is upfront about the values it is forwarding
and the evidence it is crediting than an opinion that obscures its own
normative foundations.' 22 In a constitutional context in which normatively
tinged line drawing ("value selection") is inevitable, there is a strong
argument in favor of any methodology that maximizes transparency.
Finally, to the extent that this objection turns on a concern that judges
engaged in unmediated constitutional interpretation are more likely to
invalidate democratically enacted legislation that those disciplined by
mediating doctrine, the objection is unsupported by Justice Stevens's
record. To the contrary, Justice Stevens's equal protection jurisprudence
demonstrates that unmediated constitutional interpretation does not lead
119. The traditional articulation of this assumption, first coined by Gerald Gunther, was,
of course, that strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact" while rational basis
review provides "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, supra note
2, at 8.
120. Dorf, supra note 18, at 954. Even when doctrine arguably points to a particular
result, the Court has been willing-and able-to reject that result for a more normatively
desirable one while continuing to pledge fealty to the mediating doctrine. For an astute
discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the recent affirmative action decisions, see
Roosevelt, supra note 27, at 1700-07. He concludes, "Subterfuge is the natural response to
doctrine that appears to direct the wrong outcome." Id. at 1707.
121. See Roosevelt, supra note 27, at 1686-93 (explaining how doctrine gradually grows
outdated and is either surreptitiously ignored by the Court and/or affirmatively replaced);
White, supra note 2 (demonstrating the modem tiered review is but the latest round in a
persistent effort to develop doctrine to divide areas of intense judicial involvement from
areas of judicial abdication, explaining how prior versions of such doctrine gradually became
unworkable and collapsed over time, and suggesting that tiered review is well on its way to
the same fate).
122. Cf Roosevelt, supra note 27, at 1689-92 (describing the alternative strategy as
"subterfuge").
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inexorably to broad judicial usurpation of democratic lawmaking
prerogatives, but is instead a methodology whose consequences for the
relative authority of the various branches of government turns on the jurist's
understanding of the substantive provision at issue. Despite his very
different methodology, Justice Stevens has been well within the mainstream
of the Court with regard to the amount of legislation he would strike down
under the Equal Protection Clause. 123 Even in the absence of mediating
tiers that command such a result, Justice Stevens, like his colleagues, has
granted substantial latitude to the popularly elected branches to draw
classifications that impose burdens and distribute benefits unevenly across
society. For Justice Stevens, that deference stems not from a prudential rule
or from mediating doctrine designed to balance justice and democracy, but
from his understanding of the Constitution's substance, particularly his
conviction that among policies that might plausibly be adopted 124
by rational
and impartial legislatures, the Equal Protection Clause is neutral.
3. Argument 3: Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation Is a Fool's
Errand
Still other critics have suggested that the idea of unmediated
constitutional interpretation is a chimera, a logical and logistical
impossibility. 125 This argument takes a number of different forms. In
arguing this position, some scholars have insisted that the rights-bearing
provisions of the Constitution are so vague and open-ended that they
provide little guidance in resolving concrete cases. To resolve concrete
constitutional debates, judges must, at a minimum, develop an
understanding of the relevant provision's underlying normative
commitments. 126 (Moreover, in ascertaining such commitments, the text
standing alone is radically indeterminate and, therefore, of little help.) The
adoption-for largely nontextual reasons-of one particular conception of
the normative meaning of a textual provision constitutes the adoption of
mediating doctrine, even if the judge does not articulate such an
understanding (indeed, even if the judge does not appreciate that he or she
has adopted such an understanding).
123. As noted above, see supra note 110, Justice Stevens has been in the majority in the
great majority of recent equal protection cases. For every area where he would, if given his
druthers, strike down more legislation (for example, political gerrymandering and perhaps
certain kinds of irrational economic or tax policies) there is an area (for example, racial
gerrymandering and perhaps benign gender classifications) where he would strike down less.
124. See supra Part II.B.2.a-b. Justice Stevens tends to focus his attention in equal
protection cases on the question of whether there are rational, legitimate, or impartial reasons
for the classification at issue, thus imposing relatively modest substantive obligations on
lawmakers.
125. The most sophisticated work developing this point is that of Professor Berman. For
a list of his recent articles developing this point, see supranote 13.
126. This argument is central to the life project of many important modem constitutional
thinkers. For some important examples, see generally Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law:
The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (1997); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire
(1986); Sager, supranote 32.
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Another version of this argument, voiced most persuasively by Professor
Berman, insists that even in moving from statements about constitutional
meaning to decisions in particular concrete cases, courts must adopt
decisional rules of some sort because the courts "lack[] unmediated access"
12 7
to the facts necessary to resolve the substantive constitutional questions.
Since judges lack omniscience, all they can do, in the absence of mediating
doctrine, is adopt substantive readings of the Constitution and gather
evidence as to whether the lines drawn by their operative substantive
propositions have been transgressed. When it comes time to reach a
conclusion in a specific case, however, the courts by definition must rely on
some form of mediating doctrine-some rule of decision-to process the
relevant evidence and reach a conclusion. "It is the fact of epistemic
uncertainty that makes decision rules (or something functionally equivalent)
1 28
unavoidable."
According to this reading, a judge who sets out to implement the
Constitution without mediating doctrine is engaging in a fool's errand.
While he may think he is simply applying the Constitution's substance
directly to the facts of particular cases, he is actually applying certain
unspoken rules for processing those facts and reaching a conclusion. Most
likely such a judge is simply ascertaining whether or not, given the totality
of the facts, he is persuaded that the Constitution has been transgressed. If
that is the judge's thought process he might be said to be applying a
"preponderance of the evidence" standard as his decisional rule. 129 Rather
than eschewing mediating doctrine, he has unthinkingly adopted a
mediating rule without any reflection on whether such a rule either
minimizes errors or achieves any of the other purposes (such as deterrence
and cost minimization) that mediating doctrine might serve.
There is a logical purity to arguments about the impossibility of
unmediated interpretation, but I doubt that these arguments would detain
Justice Stevens for long. In response to the argument that the text of a
provision such as the Equal Protection Clause is indeterminate and,
therefore, requires normative extrapolation before it can be applied to
concrete constitutional disputes, Justice Stevens would almost certainly
agree with those premises but reject the implication that those facts in any
way call into doubt his equal protection methodology. As discussed
above, 13 0 Justice Stevens is willing to articulate a normative understanding
of the Equal Protection Clause in language that deviates, in at least
superficial ways, 131 from the provision's text. Moreover, though he never
says so expressly, I suspect that he is humble enough to acknowledge that
his reading of the Clause's substance is not the only possible reading of the
text. Nevertheless, I believe that he would cling to the opinion that his
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Berman, DecisionRules, supra note 13, at 10.
Id. at l0 n.35.
See id. at 10.
See supra notes 68, 75-77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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careful and relatively small steps away from the text differ not only in
degree but also in kind from the approaches of scholars and judges who
develop elaborate theories of constitutional interpretation premised on
normative considerations external to or only tangentially related to the
text's promise.
As detailed above, 132 his opinions-whatever their
strengths or weaknesses-reveal a jurist whose eyes remain continually
fixed on the textual command and committed to treating each case as a
unique effort to actualize the Constitution's articulated ideal.
Similarly, Justice Stevens would probably meet the observation that
every constitutional case by definition utilizes a decisional rule with a shrug
of the shoulders. As a descriptive matter, Professor Berman is undoubtedly
right-to reach a decision one must have a rule for ascertaining the
consequences of the available evidence. But the normative upshot of that
observation is not abundantly clear. In the great bulk of his equal
protection decisions, Justice Stevens appears to be weighing the
accumulated evidence as to the constitutionality of the challenged practice
without assumptions or presumptions, thereby utilizing what Professor
Berman would call a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 133 It is
certainly logically and linguistically defensible to call such a standard a
"mediating doctrine," but to do so blurs a crucial distinction between
Justice Stevens's approach and that of other judges and commentators who
adopt or advocate tiers, a sliding-scale balancing test, or other cumbersome
mediating rules. Where judges using the tiers or another similar mediating
system are constantly required to ask themselves complicated questions
about how to classify particular cases and about whether the evidence of
unconstitutionality reaches a line that has been drawn in a purposefully low
or purposefully high place, Justice Stevens is required simply to ask himself
whether-all things considered-he finds himself persuaded. Thus, unlike
his colleagues, Justice Stevens is free in any given case to ponder upon and
pursue a normatively satisfying result in a manner that is, in a meaningful
way, unmediated.
Finally, even if one were to grant that it is logically impossible to
interpret the Constitution in a completely unmediated way, such a
conclusion ought not be read as a license to develop elaborate mediating
structures that draw judicial attention far afield from the text's core
promise. Put more bluntly, the fact that it may be logically impossible to
apply constitutional meaning directly to concrete cases does not necessarily
establish that judges should not endeavor to do so. To the contrary, perfect
enforcement of the Constitution's substance might be one of those idealslike complete neutrality, total dispassion, or pure humility-that can never
be achieved yet can only even be approached if we strive to achieve the
impossible. It is fully likely that Justice Stevens has gotten some equal
protection rulings "wrong," either by discounting the prejudice and

132. See supra Part lI.B.2.b.
133. Berman, Decision Rules, supra note 13, at 10.
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partiality that actually motivated particular legislation or by
misunderstanding legislative bungling as evidence of irrational bias or
stereotyping. Nevertheless, he would likely argue-and I would tend to
concur-that, by approaching the constitutional question directly rather
than through an elaborate tiered mediating doctrine, he has come much
closer to operationalizing the Constitution's commitment to equal
protection than others who have consciously deployed a mediating doctrine.
At least with regard to a constitutional principle so essential to both
individual liberty and the proper functioning of democratic government,
that fact alone might justify the conscious adoption of an unmediated
approach.
B. A Lingering Concern
I find much to admire in Justice Stevens's largely unmediated approach
to equal protection cases and am skeptical about many of the leading
arguments usually offered against such a methodology. Nonetheless, for
reasons that are at first blush hard to articulate, I have a difficult time giving
unqualified approval to an unmediated constitutional methodology.
Perhaps my (limited) disquiet reflects nothing more than an inability to
transcend an ill-founded professional and cultural consensus. While I do
not fully discount that possibility, I suspect that my lack of unqualified
approval is at least in part grounded in legitimate concerns about the
implications of unmediated constitutional interpretation for the healthy
34
functioning of our constitutional democracy. 1
While deciding cases in a legally and normatively satisfying manner is an
essential judicial function, constitutional theorists have long argued that the
courts (and in particular the Supreme Court) actually perform a variety of
roles, several of which are essential to the functioning of a constitutional
democracy. Determining the boundaries of the Court's proper role has, of
course, been an obsession of modem constitutional scholarship and
arguments about the consequences for both justice and democracy of
different institutional arrangements have increasingly come to dominate
constitutional theory. 135 Both theorists engaged in the larger project of
broadly defending our constitutional design and those who more closely
study the functioning of doctrine, have emphasized the responsibility that
the Justices bear for adopting a workable set of rules that can be understood
by the public, implemented by the court, and engaged by the larger
36
culture.1
134. I have been pushed on the issues raised in this section by a number of people. This
portion of the Article benefits in particular from my reflections on the private comments of
Josie Brown and a public question from Pam Karlan. I thank them both for highlighting this
concern.
135. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001); Sager,
supra note 32; Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Democracies Do (2002).
136. For examples from the latter group, see, for example, Berman, Decision Rules, supra
note 13, at 93-100 (explaining the various factors that go into the selection of appropriate
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Drawing on their arguments, one can grant that Justice Stevens's
opinions more fully reflect the Constitution's normative commitments than
those of his colleagues, and that they do so without encouraging either legal
instability or judicial aggrandizement, but still insist that his adoption of
such an approach disserves the nation. Such an argument would insist that,
while Justice Stevens's approach reaches normatively desirable results in
the cases at hand, it fails to appreciate the Supreme Court's broader
responsibilities. If the Supreme Court's project is not only to decide cases
correctly but also to provide citizens, politicians, and lower courts with the
tools to transform constitutional aspirations into lived reality, then
unmediated interpretation is, at a minimum, disquieting. A Supreme Court
that declines to provide more detailed guidance for adhering to,
understanding, and embracing the Constitution, but instead insists that the
answer to every constitutional question can be achieved only through the
nuanced application of judgment to text, is committing itself to serve as the
ultimate arbiter of every close constitutional question and relegating the
public, the other branches, and the lower courts to the role of spectators.
To some extent, this argument is an extension of the arguments about
unmediated doctrine and the rule of law that are discussed above. 137 To the
extent that these concerns echo those arguments, the responses detailed
above remain salient.138 However, the concern voiced here is not just about
consistency, efficiency, and process, but is more deeply rooted in the
question of what kind of constitutional culture we wish to have. In an era in
which the Court has claimed an unprecedented authority to conclusively
interpret the Constitution and the nation has largely acquiesced, the
adoption of a constitutional methodology that relies almost exclusively on
39
judicial judgment ought, at minimum, raise eyebrows. 1
Justice Stevens has proven time and again that wisdom and justice often
flow from the application of judicial judgment to difficult and contentious
issues. In the equal protection context in particular, his reluctance to adopt
constraining doctrine has enabled him to write with enviable moral insight.
However, even in a world where all judges were graced with his skill and
humanity, leaving interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to the
unmediated judgment of the Supreme Court would not be costless. In a
world where we can safely assume that not every judge is a Justice Stevens,
it may well be that those costs remain worth absorbing, but that conclusion
is not self-evident.
Justice Stevens's equal protection jurisprudence
constitutional decisional rules, many of which go to their consequences for other courts and
non-judicial actors); Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 12 (laying out a
vision of the Supreme Court's role in which it is charged with coming up with workable
rules for implementing, not just interpreting, the Constitution).
137. See supra Part III.A. 1.
138. See supraPart III.A.1.
139. On the Court's recent accretion of interpretive power, see, for example, Rachel E.
Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the

Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 237 (2002); Larry Kramer, The Supreme
Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2001).

2006]

EQUAL PROTECTION UNMODIFIED

2369

demonstrates the virtues of an unmediated approach to constitutional
interpretation, but such a demonstration does not end the conversation as to
the advisability of such a methodology, but rather begins it.

Notes & Observations

